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New England Journal of Public Policy
The Battle for What Do We
City Hall Fight Over?
Louise Simmons
An important dimension of contemporary American urban politics involves the redis-
tributive role of local government. Activism at the local level has produced electoral
movements that have succeeded in electing progressive local candidates and coalitions,
yet on assuming office those officials face tremendous obstacles in meeting the expecta-
tions of those who put them in office. From 1991 to 1993 in Hartford, Connecticut,
an attempt at progressive governance by a multiracial coalition was fraught with diffi-
culties. Tensions among progressives and among leadership from impoverished commu-
nities of color, responses ofdowntown interests and the media, fiscal crises and the
unrelenting needs of the population, served to complicate or stymie redistributive efforts
and led to electoral defeat. However, new mechanisms for popular participation and
several other reform measures were accomplished.
In recent years, as social movements reflecting the needs of urban populations
assert themselves through local politics, this activism reveals a number of dilemmas
of American urban politics. A host of issues is presented when activists, variously
described as urban populist or progressive regimes, 1 assume state and local public
offices. Particularly in distressed cities, the combined problems of fiscal stress, tax base
erosion, racial isolation, and lack of state and federal support make for a knotty collec-
tion of issues confronting new officeholders. Because cities are where huge social ques-
tions of race, class, gender, inequality, and social policy converge and many facets of
struggles over the outcome of political and economic change are played out, the manner
of local governing takes on increasing significance. What city governments do in such
areas as education, administration of local welfare programs, treatment of indigent and
marginalized populations, provision of alternatives for youth, and the tenor of police-
community relations all involve choices that seriously affect the quality of everyday liv-
ing. These redistributional and social consumption issues animate vital social move-
ments in urban areas in which the local state has a significant mitigating role.
For reform-oriented or progressive regimes, especially those which attempt to
advance the interests of impoverished communities of color, these issues take on large
proportions and present stunning dilemmas. Officeholders face a variety of challenges
ranging from holding political coalitions together, to dealing with traditional interest
groups — including powerful and sometimes antagonistic downtown business interests
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— to attempting whatever redistributive measures are available for local government, to
managing the city's finances, to carrying out routine service delivery, and more. They
must strike a balance among competing priorities, even of those constituencies to whom
they feel most responsible.
Once the decision is made to participate in electoral politics — to participate in "the
system" — one's expectations of the possibility of reform need to be defined or
acknowledged. The problem for many progressives is whether and how to engage in
such redistributive ventures as equity planning2 in light of the understanding that class
and race divisions are endemic to the larger social order in America. These questions are
sometimes posed as either/or dilemmas: 3 either one operates outside the existing politi-
cal system and remains pure or within the political system that one acknowledges as
inherently inequitable and thus becomes complicit in perpetuating the inequality. Yet
another way to frame the problem is one in which the actual praxis evolves and reveals
the opportunities for reform, creating openings for progressives to play a role.
Hartford's Background and Recent Political History
Hartford, Connecticut, is one the most dramatic examples of modern urban misfortunes
in the United States. Within its inelastic borders4 is a population with tremendous needs.
Ranked the fourth poorest city in the country in 1980 based on percentage of population
under the federal population (25.2%), by 1990 it ranked as the eighth poorest city, even
as the percentage of population in poverty actually increased (27.5 %). 5 While it is the
capital city of the state with the consistently highest per capita income in the country,
Hartford is Connecticut's poorest city. It also has the nation's second highest rate of
children living in poverty, more than 39 percent. 6 Every modern urban problem can be
found in Hartford: third world-level infant mortality rates high levels of teenage preg-
nancy; inadequate housing; soaring crime rate; drug trafficking; lethal gang activity; a
tragically high incidence of AK)S; racial segregation and isolation within the city's edu-
cational system.
The poverty within the city combines with racial segregation to produce remarkable
social cleavage in the Hartford area. Affluent suburbs with a much different composition
surround Hartford. While Hartford's 1990 population was 36 percent African-American
and 32 percent Hispanic, the neighboring thirty-seven towns in the Hartford Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) were more than 92 percent white. Hartford houses
18 percent of the 768,000 people who live in the metropolitan area, yet it is home to 65
percent of the area's African-American population and 76 percent of its Hispanic popu-
lation. 7 White households in the region enjoyed an average income of $24,749 in 1980,
while black household incomes averaged $15,812 and Hispanics $12,694. 8 By 1990
more than 92 percent of the 27,000 public school students in Hartford were African-
American, Hispanic, or other minorities and a landmark school desegregation suit was
filed to address this segregation.
The capital of Connecticut has high levels of government-sector employment and is
still considered a major insurance center with large concentrations of employment in
this industry. Aetna, Travelers, and other insurance companies maintain significant pres-
ence in Hartford, and the defense giant United Technologies has its corporate headquar-
ters in downtown Hartford. These industries have spawned a host of services and suppli-
ers in the city and the larger Hartford region. While the city's business community is
quite sophisticated and highly organized, there is incredible social distance between the
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corporate officers who commute into these headquarters and the people who populate
Hartford's neighborhoods.
Hartford's recent political history reflects both the growing political organization of
the city's African-American and Puerto Rican communities and the increasing needs and
claims of the population on a fragmented city government. The structure of municipal
government is an odd hybrid of reform and tradition, including a nine-member city
council elected at-large— with three seats reserved, per state statute, for a minority
party; a city manager as the city's chief administrative officer who is selected — or dis-
missed— by the city council; and a popularly elected mayor whose position is visible
but lacking in authority.
Registered Democrats solidly outnumber registered Republicans: Hartford voters
went for Democratic presidential candidates in all presidential elections in the last sever-
al decades and voted resoundingly for Jesse Jackson in the 1984 and 1988 presidential
primaries and for Jerry Brown in that of 1992. Given this intense identification with the
Democratic Party within the city's population, intraparty divisions and contests are
intense political battles within Hartford. Like Ira Katznelson's depiction of them in New
York City, the factions of Hartford's Democratic Party tend to organize around race, eth-
nicity, and territoriality. 9 These bases of organization, in turn, largely reflect the city's
racial housing patterns.
Within City Hall, city council leadership and voting blocs are key to policy develop-
ment in Hartford. Six Democrats are routinely elected to the council and usually control
the city's policy agenda. However, the city manager, who has wide discretion in carry-
ing out policy initiatives, particularly in budgetary matters, is the individual to whom
city departments are accountable. Within this structure, there is a certain ambiguity of
accountability that is quite apparent to the citizenry. Individuals and community organi-
zations sometimes take their concerns to council members, at other times call on the city
manager or go to see the mayor.
Council leadership is an important element of Hartford politics. Nicholas Carbone,
celebrated as a "progressive" policy leader by Pierre Clavel, 10 set the tone for Hartford's
city government during the 1970s. Carbone is credited with elevating the position of
deputy mayor on the council and with forging public-private partnerships in Hartford
during the seventies. However, by 1979 his political hold was unraveling and Carbone
was defeated in a bitter Democratic primary.
During the 1980s, the Hartford African-American community made important politi-
cal gains. In 1981 Thirman Milner became the first popularly elected African-American
mayor in all of New England and served until 1987. That year Carrie Saxon Perry, an
African-American woman and multiterm state representative, sought election and won,
drawing national attention as the first African-American woman to be elected mayor of
a major city. But in 1993, a white South End political operative, Michael Peters, after
losing a September Democratic primary to her, wrested the mayoralty away from Perry,
winning the November election by running as an independent.
The Puerto Rican community also began to realize its political potential during the
1980s, particularly after the formation in the mid-eighties of the Puerto Rican Political
Action Committee (PAC), which brought together a number of elements of leadership in
the Puerto Rican community. The PAC was active in the 1987 municipal elections and
in the 1988 elections for the Connecticut legislature in which Hartford's first two Puerto
Rican legislators were elected.
In 1987, a new entity entered the political arena in Hartford. People for Change
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(PFC) constituted itself as a combination third party and community coalition. 11 The
group emerged from a linkage battle waged when community organizations pressed for
taxation on downtown development to benefit the neighborhoods, and from dissatisfac-
tion by labor unions over the city's response in a lengthy strike at Colt Firearms. Other
key forces included the Puerto Rican PAC and women's and gay rights organizations.
PFC ran a slate of three individuals for the three city council seats reserved for a minori-
ty party in the November 1987 general election and captured two seats. They hoped to
forge an alliance with other council members to pursue a reform agenda and were aided
in their electoral quest by disaffected Democrats and the technical assistance of the
Legislative Electoral Action Program (LEAP), an organization formed in the early 1980s
to provide technical assistance to progressive candidates. 12 PFC was also the inspiration
for one of the successful Puerto Rican candidates for state representative in 1988.
The 1987 PFC slate included an African-American woman neighborhood leader and
a Puerto Rican community activist, both of whom were elected, and a third, white, can-
didate who lost his bid. In 1989, after the incumbent woman decided to run with the
Democratic Party slate and fell in step with a closely controlled Democratic caucus,
another African-American woman, a social worker who served on the board of educa-
tion and Hartford's first openly gay candidate, ran with the incumbent Eugenio Caro.
Again, the two candidates of color won while the openly gay candidate lost. One lone
Republican remained on the council until 1991, when the entire PFC slate, including
me, successfully sought office.
In 1991, after two years of escalating tensions with the Democratic city council
members, mayor Carrie Saxon Perry decided to assemble a council slate to challenge
the entire set of six Democratic incumbents. It included two African-Americans, two
Puerto Ricans, and two whites, a significant shift in power toward the Puerto Rican
community as previous Democratic council slates had included only one Puerto Rican
candidate. People for Change agreed to support her effort in a September primary in
exchange for support for the three-person PFC slate in November, and an intense and
emotional campaign brought her and her supporters an overwhelming victory. However,
the tenuous effort at coalition politics effectively broke down during the 1991-1993
council term, resulting in a tumultuous 1993 election season.
Besides the 1993 victory of independent candidate Peters for mayor, the election pro-
duced a city council consisting of four of the six council candidates on the Perry slate
and two from another slate, including Eugenio Caro, who had left PFC to seek election
as a Democrat. The November election saw the emergence of a fusion slate consisting
of three Republicans and the two non-Perry Democrats, who, in turn, backed Michael
Peters in his independent bid for mayor. All three PFC candidates, of whom I was one,
lost. The four Democrats who had run with Perry and survived the primary were also
elected, but effectively became the "minority" caucus on the council. The direction of
the council shifted sharply: the five-person fusion bloc elected a conservative
Republican as the majority leader and Caro as deputy mayor, a role that would become
largely ceremonial. Any progressive thrust of the 1991-1993 council was abruptly halt-
ed, and a new urban conservatism took hold of Hartford City Hall.
The Experience of Holding Office
At the outset of holding office, I was wary of how limited and constrained city govern-
ments are: existing literature and my own research lent credence to these arguments. I
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was convinced that cities have relatively little independence in a larger political econo-
my in which private-sector actions largely influence a local economy, a fairly economic
determinist view. I envisioned my role as advocating for any reforms that could be eked
out of the situation, hoped I could illuminate some of the major issues and contradic-
tions for constituents, but did not think that many substantial improvements in people's
lives could be won at the City Hall level. I was somewhat apprehensive that many ques-
tions— traffic patterns, zoning, and the like— would be uninteresting. I believed
municipal government had little power at its disposal and basically functioned as flack
catcher for the entire economic system and that making a more important difference is
possible only at higher levels of government where more far-reaching decisions are
reached. Yet I did feel that City Hall was sufficiently important to warrant my participa-
tion and was prepared to work hard in my new role.
I am now thoroughly convinced that cities have very little control over their econom-
ic destinies, but that municipal government is indeed an important arena of policy devel-
opment, that it has a great deal to do with how people experience everyday life, even if
its powers are greatly constrained. I offer as proof some of the policy initiatives of our
successors who have a much different philosophy: redefining priorities and shifting
Community Development Block Grant funds away from human services into vaguely
defined economic development areas; privatizing a city-run child health clinic; support-
ing the privatizing of the entire school system by the board of education; opposing a
soup kitchen being located in a downtown church basement and rooms being made
available for recovering substance abusers in a downtown hotel — actions that would
not have been contemplated by the council on which I served, however divided it might
have been.
In devising and implementing local policy consistent with what Norman Krumholz
and Pierre Clavel identified as the thrusts of progressive regimes 13 — redistribution and
participation — we faced enormous challenges that served to complicate or thwart our
efforts: the opposing interests, particularly the business and downtown interests; internal
dissension; unrelenting needs of the population; fragmented government structures; and
our own mistakes. We did succeed in creating a more inclusive local government and
opened new avenues of participation, thereby raising popular expectations and, in my
view, encountering the types of problems associated with disappointing those expecta-
tions. Moreover, that disappointment, felt both by those of us in office who were com-
mitted to a progressive agenda and by many sectors of the population, ultimately con-
tributed to electoral defeat.
Tensions within the Progressive Coalition
Progressive coalitions do not work in any automatic sense. Even in coalitions whose
partners share similar ideologies and assessments, agreement on courses of action must
be carefully forged to ensure unity. In our case, with varying perspectives among the
officeholders, unity proved elusive. Yet in order to pursue redistributive policies that in
all probability would generate controversy, unity would have been required among the
officeholders. The difficulties were endemic from the start: the basis for the 1991
Democratic primary slate and later the People for Change campaign was an anti-incum-
bent sentiment with different actors and groups signing on for very different reasons and
with very distinct assumptions and purposes. All the major forces in the coalition
wanted a more inclusive and responsive local government: the African-American com-
munity, the Puerto Rican community, the South End group composed mainly of Italian
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small-business people, and progressives from the fields of labor, human services, and
education.
Although the campaign generated immense energy and hopefulness, there was only a
thin degree of unity among the nine council candidates, a weakness that was to be easily
exploited by the effort's detractors. Each candidate came to the effort with different per-
sonal constituencies and agendas that could be synchronized for purposes of the cam-
paign: the various ethnic and racial leaders who all felt shut out of City Hall could coa-
lesce around particular candidates, while the progressive activists from labor and other
organizations could focus on PFC. When the Hartford Courant gave its endorsements in
the primary race only to several members and not the entire slate, individual rivalries
and divisiveness began.
The unity of the coalition was broken essentially by three factors: individual agendas
and quests for power; ideological differences; tensions between African-American and
Puerto Rican political leaders and how they perceived their community's aspirations.
Depending on where one sat, one or another of these factors was more salient. Even
within PFC there were different perspectives over whether this was primarily an issue of
ethnic succession among communities of color or a progressive/pro-corporate split.
Some viewed it as the former, while I viewed it as the latter, with the business interests
able to take advantage of ethnic and racial tensions in order to defeat a regime they per-
ceived as too radical.
Individual Quests for Power and Ideological Differences. For roughly eight months,
Mayor Perry was able to assert leadership in the coalition. A progressive agenda was
being melded in fits and starts. During this time, however, the business community
began to court several council members, rifts began to simmer among African-American
and Puerto Rican political leadership, and critical issues were coming before the coun-
cil. A search for a city manager was started.
Eventually, as the title of Chinua Achebe's novel states, things fell apart. 14 The mayor
and council had implemented a system of rotating the position of deputy mayor in the
beginning of the term in order to avoid a divisive internal election early in our tenure.
As July 1992 neared, and the necessity to choose a permanent deputy mayor loomed,
jockeying for the position had intensified and one council member, an upwardly mobile
African-American woman, was pressuring several colleagues vigorously for their sup-
port. She had begun to clash with Mayor Perry and became aligned with the Chamber of
Commerce. The key point at which the coalition fell apart occurred when she was able
to coalesce a majority of five members —she herself and four others — to elect her
deputy mayor.
The ideological differences among the officeholders were not initially a serious
basis of division, but they became more salient over time as the personal animosities
deepened and ideological divergences could be used by members of the council to justi-
fy particular positions on issues. Moreover, the downtown business interests could
exploit ideological differences in their efforts to develop loyalty among several council
members.
This division produced a situation in which Howard Stanback, the city manager, was
a Perry ally, affording her and her council allies access to the city administration, while
the corporation counsel became allied with and helped to buttress the five-person major-
ity. Council meetings became long, drawn-out debates — characterized by the local
media as bickering— thereby trivializing some of the major ideological or program-
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matic disparities between the two factions. On occasion the manager might offer a pro-
posal, only to be blocked by the corporation counsel.
Another key factor in the coalition's not holding together was its lack of program-
matic preparation for taking over the reigns of government and its inability to move
swiftly to implement policies. Since all six Democratic council members and I were
novices, and there was more consensus between the Democratic challengers and People
for Change about ousting the prior regime than about what a new approach to gover-
nance would resemble, a great deal of time had to be spent after the election and on
assuming office acclimating new officeholders. Moreover, there was no prior agreement
on specific projects to be undertaken once everyone was sworn into office. Many initia-
tives had to await the arrival of Howard Stanback, whose experience and philosophy fit
with the coalition. He was unable to relocate until June of 1992, a difficult time frame
for a fragile coalition to endure. The council first asked an incumbent, more conserva-
tive city manager, Raymond Eugene Shipman, to leave, then appointed as interim city
manager a veteran attorney in the corporation counsel's office who was close to retire-
ment. During the time the search was conducted for the permanent manager— although
it is truly an oxymoron to describe the Hartford city manager's position as permanent—
political divisions began to fester. When Stanback arrived, controversy was already sim-
mering despite his competence and experience.
Tensions Under the Rainbow: What I label tensions under the rainbow cannot be under-
estimated in terms of how they may serve to detract from more redistributive efforts.
During the term, these tensions manifested as a contest between the generation of
African-American political leaders who had finally achieved a measure of political suc-
cess in Hartford with certain limited opportunities to create patronage and the newly
emerging Puerto Rican political leadership who were anxious to "deliver" to their com-
munity. This type of contest over remaining opportunities for patronage, however limit-
ed, can easily intensify and poses a most significant obstacle to overcome in multiracial
electoral endeavors, despite the similar needs and conditions in the respective communi-
ties.
African-Americans and Puerto Ricans defy the conventional ethnic succession model
in which political incorporation eventually affords an ethnic community the ability to
assimilate and move out of a central city to an ethnically diffused, suburban existence. 15
Few such opportunities are available to Hartford's African-Americans and especially to
its Puerto Rican residents, although several suburbs now have growing numbers of those
two ethnic groups. Indeed, at the core of the debate surrounding the notion of the under-
class is the issue of the persistent lack of opportunity for African-Americans, Puerto
Ricans, and other communities of color. Therefore, even as constrained as the patronage
opportunities might be, any openings created through political participation and organi-
zation are coveted and can become the object of rivalry between the two communities.
Although the greatest beneficiaries of such political patronage are the middle class and
professional segments of the communities of color, these plums can become symbolical-
ly important to the communities.
In our term, one such dispute arose soon after Howard Stanback took office, when he
attempted to hire an African-American consultant to do a study of the management
information capacity and requirements of city departments. The effort was thwarted
when one of the Puerto Rican city council members who had previously endorsed the
project changed his position to one of open opposition and eventually garnered suffi-
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cient votes to halt the entire project. Economic development loan funds available to
small businesses in the city likewise generated similar controversies and broke the coali-
tion's unity.
Redistributive Efforts
There are extremely limited means available for redistributive efforts at the local level.
Moreover, any measures an urban regime attempts with respect to redistribution elicit
reactions from a variety of constituencies, thereby provoking another key component of
a battle over a city hall. Given the context of urban crisis and decay in the United States,
this redistributional role of local government and the controversies inherent in such a
role deserve attention and analysis. In our case, the relative emphasis within the
Hartford coalition on redistributional policies became a focal point of opposition, illus-
trating a dimension of urban politics that is more than a battle over land use and the
terms of fostering of a growth machine, 16 as urban politics are typically described. For
urban populists, for a black urban regime, for progressive activists, and for affected
impoverished communities, alleviating poverty and providing support to those in need
are fundamental motivations for even participating in the electoral arena. 17 Despite all
the constraining factors in the attempt to foster social change through a city hall, there
are vastly different approaches to local governance, especially in this area.
Controversies over redistributional goals might be characterized as an inevitable
consequence of the clash of competing imperatives facing officeholders suggested by
Martin Shefter. 18 Alternatively, they may be viewed in a manner suggested by David
Harvey as one facet of the experimentation involved in flexible accumulation strategies
of capital — a contingent local response to structural change— in which the relative
strength of social movements has great influence over the outcome. 19 Regardless, the
choices available at city hall have significance in how everyday life is experienced.
Hartford's pressing social needs, particularly in the two key areas of education and wel-
fare, and the reaction of the business community to redistributive efforts, exemplified
in the case of a local debate on health care reform, depict some of these controversies.
Social Needs Among the Population. A consistent issue for mayors of color, especially a
city's first mayor of color, and for urban populists or progressives, is the problem of
raised expectations among constituents that everyday life will improve. In Hartford, a
small city with the extensive poverty noted earlier, this was certainly the case. The
resources at the disposal of City Hall to deal with such poverty are largely inadequate,
although it is clear that local government has a role to play in addressing inequality.
Two important areas illustrate this dilemma.
Education: Hartford's heavy reliance on property taxes to raise local revenue juxta-
posed against a school system overburdened by attempts to educate the poorest children
in the region has produced a crisis-ridden education system. During the first year of the
council term, a protracted set of negotiations between the teachers union and the board
of education produced a contract settlement that the council had to ratify. The contract,
which came under heavy criticism by the media, various political leaders, and a parent
group, was characterized as too generous to the teachers in light of the city's dire bud-
getary straits. The majority of council members approved the contract, given that
through the terms of the agreement certain costly arbitration awards were dropped by
the teachers and incentives for early retirement were created. Leaders in the teachers
union had been a vital part of the winning coalition, a fact that was seized on by the
forces opposing the settlement.
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As budget deliberations unfolded during each of the term's two years, huge deficits
were faced: $17 million in the first year and $30 million in the second within an overall
budget of between $430 million and $440 million. In Hartford's system, the city council
adopts a budget that includes the board of education's allocation, an amount generally
less than that requested by the board in an often highly publicized request. The funds
appropriated to the board account for close to half the operating budget outright and
there are additional costs associated with education that are absorbed in other portions
of the city's budget. Yet there is generally a great deal of tension over how much the
city allocates to the board, and the two bodies often engage in a public rhetorical
slugfest over how much the city can afford, what with all the other services it must
fund, versus what it should devote to education. For a progressive on the council side
of the dilemma, it ranks as a worst nightmare.
A highly vocal parent group that emerged from a South End neo-Alinsky organiza-
tion pressured the council for more education funds. 20 It was especially tenacious during
the second year of the term in lobbying for several million more dollars than the council
had adopted. The group demanded the attendance of the mayor and council members
at many meetings, hounded the city manager, and continued coercion until they received
a commitment of allocation funds as they could be identified during the course of the
fiscal year. When the regime changed, the new incumbents reneged on that pledge.
Many of the parents in this group were also active in Peters's 1993 campaign, sup-
ported the Republicans and their conservative thrust for the council — it was the Re-
publican leadership that decided not to fulfill the promised funds for education during
the portion of fiscal year 1995 when they assumed office— and became ardent sup-
porters of a plan to privatize the management of the schools, the first time such an
extensive privatization plan has been attempted.
Welfare: Hartford's population includes a large number of families and individuals on
public assistance. As noted earlier, over 27 percent of the city's population lives below
the poverty line, and large numbers of working residents constitute the working poor.
Hartford has the largest general assistance (GA) caseload in Connecticut, usually some
one-third of the state's entire GA population. Social services available in Hartford gen-
erally are not replicated in suburban towns in the region so that people in need of those
services leave their towns of origin and find refuge in Hartford's network of shelters and
services.
We attempted to deal with the issue of welfare by asserting ourselves in the debate
at the state legislature over changes and reforms to the welfare system and by attempt-
ing certain innovations in mental health services and job training for clients. When
the legislature enacted a law that allowed cities to limit the receipt of general assistance
to nine months, Hartford opted not to institute the provision because such a move would
create huge disruption in the lives of the recipients as well as certain unrest. Moreover,
in 1992, when the legislature considered ending general assistance for so-called em-
ployables, the elected officials testified at the legislature against the proposal. In addi-
tion, the council voted to approve a tent city overnight demonstration by GA recipients
in a major downtown park as a protest, despite the opposition of downtown businesses
to the event. By its vote, the city council agreed to waive requirements for insurance
coverage for the demonstration and assume liability, along with other fees that are
routinely assessed— but often waived wholly or in part— for organizations that plan
events in city facilities and parks. Council members who were disposed to vote against
such measures were informed by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union that it would
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seek an injunction against the city if it attempted to bar the demonstration.
Elements of the local media criticized these actions as too permissive and not strict
enough with welfare recipients. They are in stark contrast to the actions of the majority
of the succeeding council and mayor, who came out against a move and expansion of a
soup kitchen operated by Catholic nuns from a building just north of the major business
district into a downtown church basement across the street from the Civic Center. That
leadership also supported a controversial position of the archbishop of the Hartford
archdiocese, who blocked the proposed move. Later, the same officials opposed the use
of several floors of a financially failing downtown hotel as housing for independently
functioning recovering substance abusers. The hotel later closed after a good deal of
controversy over the stance of the city officials, who also enacted a moratorium on any
local social service expansion.
Reactionfrom the Business Community and Health Care Reform. The members of the
1989-1991 city council and their 1991 mayoral candidate received a great deal of back-
ing from the business community. However, with an entirely new group of Democrats
and a greater role for People for Change in that term, business interests had to readjust.
One important episode involved the debate on health care reform in early 1992, a clear
illustration of a redistributional controversy.
Health care reform had been a priority in the platforms of both the Perry slate and the
PFC and became part of the council agenda in an effort to begin to implement the plat-
form. This issue was included before the nomination of Bill Clinton for president,
before the concept of managed competition emerged, and before any serious prospect of
action by Congress was contemplated. It was being considered while the major debate
on the issue was between advocates of the single payer Canadian-style plan and the pay
or play alternative. Moreover, it was taking place in the city known as the insurance
capital of the world, nicknamed the insurance city, where Aetna and Travelers Insurance
companies are the largest taxpayers and active in many facets of community life. So as
the council considered a resolution that in its original form essentially endorsed the sin-
gle payer plan, the insurance companies, to coin a phrase, went ballistic.
I chaired the council committee before which the resolution was debated and was
told by an Aetna government relations official that passage of the resolution would be
considered a hostile act by the city council. Even though the resolution was primarily
symbolic, the insurance companies took it very seriously. Insurance company employees
were mobilized to testify at council hearings, a most atypical occurrence. One of them
stated that the Hartford city council's endorsement of health care reform would be like
Detroit's city council endorsing the relaxation of car import restrictions. Congress-
woman Barbara Kennelly of Connecticut's first congressional district was enlisted to
call me at my home to discuss the issue. In the end, by a vote of 6 to 2 with one absten-
tion, the council passed a modified resolution that did not endorse a specific plan for
reform but enumerated the principles we felt should be addressed through reform— of
access, cost, universality, and quality among others. However, with the business com-
munity smarting from this action, it reverberated over time and was often used to illus-
trate our insensitivity to business.
The business community, notably through the Greater Hartford Chamber of Com-
merce, tended to deal with only a few of the council members who were most disposed
to concur with business's positions. An offshoot of the chamber, the Downtown Council,
developed its agenda of issues for the city and enlisted two members to participate in
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the body and take its agenda back to the city council. Moreover, despite the fact that city
manager Howard Stanback was extremely skilled in the field of economic development
and had extensive experience in working with the private sector— for example, over-
seeing a multimillion-dollar expansion of O'Hare Airport while serving as Chicago's
commissioner of aviation — the impression of a regime unfriendly to business persisted.
This issue culminated in a speech delivered by Ronald Compton, CEO of Aetna, to the
Chamber of Commerce during the 1993 primary campaign season in which he lambast-
ed City Hall leadership for its unfriendly attitude toward the corporate sector. This
speech was referred to continuously by our opponents in the campaigns. On the election
of Michael Peters, Compton convened a round table of elected officials — the newly
elected mayor, several incumbent state legislators, and reelected and newly elected
council members — business leaders, and several community leaders to begin a new
type of dialogue. In a similar forum held during the fall of 1994, Compton declared that
City Hall was now a hospitable place for business.
Mistrust by the business community was based on council specific actions and indi-
vidual council members' support of agendas viewed as antagonistic to business goals. I,
having extensive ties to the labor movement, was often approached by unions for assis-
tance on their issues. During several local strikes, the council took actions such as
ensuring that the conduct of police on picket lines was fair to strikers; allowing warming
trailers within the city's right-of-way near strike sites; pressuring companies through
council resolutions and appeals by the mayor's office; assessing companies for the cost
of police overtime at strikes in which companies' unfair labor practices were document-
ed; and three council members participating in a strike-related civil disobedience action
on one Martin Luther King birthday. I also worked with labor activists to craft an ordi-
nance that established a workplace rights commission whose role was to be as a monitor
of city economic development activity vis-a-vis the nature of the job creation and labor
relations fostered by city economic development. These actions made the business com-
munity uncomfortable with the actions of the council and with me in particular when
fairness to workers emerged as a theme. We maintained that workplace fairness did not
have to be construed as antibusiness.
Public Perceptions ofand Participation in the Coalition's Efforts
The 1991-1993 Hartford city government was a highly public and highly publicly scru-
tinized one. We attempted to involve a wide variety of constituencies in city issues,
develop new means of hearing the public and new methods of participation. The results
of our efforts were sometimes characterized as creating an unruly atmosphere in meet-
ings that went on too long. It seemed to some of us that we could rely on the Hartford
Courant to construe anything it could as either a scandal or evidence of our incompe-
tence or hostility to business. Yet we were able to fashion some very innovative ap-
proaches to governance.
Hostility of the Local Media. It is extremely difficult to convey the magnitude of the
local media's influence over the popular perception of our tenure in office. The city's
one daily newspaper, the Hartford Courant, functions as a key ideological outlet and
source of information for the entire state of Connecticut. Its executive officers play an
important role in many organizations throughout the state and in Hartford— for exam-
ple, the Downtown Council— and the tenor of the editorials and news reporting has a
far-reaching effect on the public's perceptions of officeholders. The Courant was unen-
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thusiastic about the election results — it had often endorsed Perry's opponents in previ-
ous primaries and general elections. During the two years, it carried many critical
editorials on issues ranging from the health care resolution to the enactment of an anti-
apartheid selective purchasing ordinance to the handling of city projects, council ap-
pointments, and more. The City Hall reporters were particularly adept at orchestrating
issues that portrayed the mayor and her council supporters as radical, inept, corrupt,
antibusiness, and so forth, negatively. Yet they downplayed or minimized her opponents'
comparable issues. Two columnists hammered the mayor continually and often gratu-
itously, inserting a jibe about her in a topic unrelated to City Hall or her actions. The
council was characterized as beset by bickering. Quotations attributed to council mem-
bers were often construed for sensationalist touches in the stories.
There were few outlets for countering the Courant or offering a different perspective.
Three English-language weekly community papers, one Spanish-language semimonthly
community paper, and one so-called alternative weekly, an arts-oriented paper, com-
mented on city events with more varied perspectives, but they also exhibited the divi-
sions of the community in some of their coverage. Two African-American-oriented
newspapers provided coverage generally less hostile to Perry and Stanback's efforts and
those of their supporters. One paper, distributed citywide, but primarily oriented toward
the prevailing politics in the South End, provided mixed coverage, but often was critical
of either Mayor Perry or her council supporters. The Spanish-language paper alternated
between supporting the coalition's efforts and offering stories more critical of the Perry
group after the council split occurred.
The broadcast media, notably the local affiliates of major television networks, did not
devote as much time in their newscasts to details of City Hall activities, but frequently
portrayed their most circushke aspects on the nightly local news. The local radio talk
show hosts had a field day with the events. One former such host had previously been a
police officer in Pennsylvania, and when the local police union clashed with the mayor
over the issue of establishing a police civilian review board, he presided over a daily,
constant barrage on his show. For reasons never fully disclosed to the public, he was
eventually dismissed from his position, then hired briefly as a lobbyist by the Hartford
Police Union.
Participatory Opportunities and Mechanisms. From 1991 to 1993, hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of people came in and out of the building: lobbying, demonstrating, working
with council members, the mayor, or city manager on various projects. Since the format
of the twice-monthly council meetings is fairly rigid and offers no opportunity for pub-
lic participation during the discussions, we decided to precede the meetings with open
forums in which the public could comment on issues before the body. Council meetings
formally begin at 8:00 P.M., so we scheduled the public session at 7:30 before the meet-
ing. That portion sometimes lasted until after 9:00 P.M. as many individuals and organi-
zations raised their concerns. It was the first time such a practice had been instituted;
previously, only ad hoc demonstrations to defy conventional processes provided such
opportunities.
The Hartford Courant was critical of this innovation, complaining that too much of a
circus atmosphere was created at the meetings. Some council members were also dis-
dainful of the sessions, particularly when they were publicly disparaged. All of us took
our share of disapproval during the two years of these forums. Yet for Perry and her
supporters this new avenue for public input became a symbol of an important direction
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for government, and we felt that the press's opposition to these sessions represented an
undemocratic impulse.
We attempted other, more substantive methods of increasing participation to address
needs. The city manager's office developed the concept of targeted neighborhoods for
city services. 21 Initially four neighborhoods, each with pressing but distinct needs, were
selected. Local community organizations were brought together in these neighborhoods
and either the city manager or a deputy city manager worked with each of the groups to
identify municipal service needs and public-private partnerships that could be developed
for each area. Community-based organizations had to agree to put aside their own dif-
ferences and work together. The plan was for a coordinated set of services to be deliv-
ered in each neighborhood: combined intake procedures for city social service, employ-
ment, and health programs; collaboration between the local schools, the city, and the
community-based organizations. Community policing was to augment the collaboration.
Some services were to be subcontracted to the community groups. Local hospitals, col-
leges, and other institutions were to be brought into the mix in new ways.
Many of these efforts were beginning to take more concrete form toward the end of
our term of office. Some initiatives proceeded more quickly than others, and some of
the collaboration lives on after the departure of Howard Stanback.
New forms of citizen participation included better utilization of city commissions.
We created several new bodies during our tenure — the Workplace Rights Commission
noted above, commissions on gay, lesbian, and bisexual issues and on ethnic diversity
— and envisioned their role as providing input to city government on their respective
issues. We also relied on advisory groups and existing commissions. As chairperson of
the Affirmative Action, Employment, Health, and Social Services Committee, I met with
and sought input from more than half a dozen commissions and advisory bodies in
devising city policy. It was both energizing and very useful to have these groups avail-
able because I felt that I had simply been thrust into the middle of a number of issues,
so the guidance of interested parties was important.
Incorporation ofNewly Emerging Constituencies and New Methods ofIncorporating
Constituencies. The establishment of the Commissions on Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Issues and the Commission on Workplace Rights, as well as other activities undertaken
to address the needs of various populations, represent not only new mechanisms for
participation, but the political development and incorporation of constituencies in new
and different ways. Constituencies considered either peripheral or on the wane in influ-
ence were able to insert themselves into municipal political processes with high degrees
of success.
Intensive political organization on the part of the Hartford gay and lesbian com-
munity over the recent past, and especially as a key component within People for
Change, meant that their political presence had to be taken seriously and their needs
and demands met by City Hall. During our tenure, we passed the Domestic Partnership
Ordinance, establishing a process for registration and recognition of domestic partner-
ships, both same-sex and opposite-sex unions, but not extending health benefits to
domestic partners of city employees. The latter provision was agreed to by commis-
sion members as a compromise in answer to criticism that a financially stressed city
could not afford to provide this benefit, a key argument offered by opponents of the
entire plan. The domestic partnership issue evoked the wrath of conservative religious
forces in the city.
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Within People for Change, labor was not regarded simply as an interest group to
approach during elections for endorsements, money, and poll workers, but as a key con-
stituency whose needs government should attempt to facilitate. This would be at least
one way to balance the general access and power that corporate interests exert in influ-
encing government policy and decisions. It goes beyond the conventional views about
construction unions and their involvement in the growth machine22— often the begin-
ning and end of a discussion of labor in urban politics — leading to a more fundamental
view of labor as a force for industrial democracy and social change. 23 Labor's needs in
strikes, organizing, and other activities were taken seriously as issues in which govern-
ment could be called upon to intervene with positive results for unions.
Activism and Advocacy: One key feature of local government during these years was
active involvement in a variety of equity-oriented issues and advocacy on behalf of
community residents. Whether in the arena of welfare, employment training, housing,
recreation, health services or other municipal goods and services, the orientation was
that government could and should be called upon to play an advocacy role. Moreover,
the role should be strongly redistributive and accrue benefits to local constituencies.
These include the utilization of local businesses, contractors, and firms, the protection of
benefit levels for recipients of public assistance, housing initiatives that emphasize
urban homesteading and home ownership opportunities, and recreational activities
geared toward equalizing provision of services across different neighborhoods.
I devoted considerable effort to the city health department's AIDS programs and the
facilitation of a local needle exchange program in collaboration with several community
organizations. When problems developed in obtaining required insurance for the com-
munity organizations, we decided that the city should extend its own insurance to pro-
vide the necessary coverage, a controversial move to the career city bureaucrats. Later,
when bureaucratic bungling by the health department resulted in the loss of state fund-
ing for certain AIDS activities, we developed a community advisory committee ofAIDS
organizations both to advise the health department and to hold it accountable. The com-
mittee, which still meets, was successful in leading a campaign to restore AIDS pro-
grams slated for elimination to the budget during the 1994-1995 deliberations of the
succeeding council.
In these matters, our orientation was that government could and should play an active
role in social advocacy: several officeholders who succeeded us have vastly different
orientations that would perhaps allow such projects to falter or die without city interven-
tion. Not unexpectedly, they believe city intervention should foster business develop-
ment as opposed to fostering social services. 24
Preservation ofMunicipal Services. One additional area involves our approach to bud-
get decisions and our desire to preserve the level and scope of services provided by the
local government to the greatest extent possible. As mentioned previously, the operating
budgets we considered ranged between $430 million and $440 million; and Hartford has
faced budget crises for several years. During the first year of our term, the city faced a
$17 million budget deficit; the second year it was $30 million. Property taxes were
already extremely high, and there was no serious consideration to raising them. Layoffs,
union concessions, and other measures whose burden fell heavily on municipal employ-
ees were abhorrent to me, to most of the council members, and to the mayor.
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In 1992 layoffs were avoided by a number of the bargaining units agreeing to copay-
ment plans in their insurance combined with hiring freezes and other cost containment
measures. In 1993 we looked under every rock and at every possible method of saving.
Besides additional hiring freezes, reorganization, reduced contractual recreation ser-
vices, we considered a host of other cost containment strategies. We adopted an early
retirement plan for city employees, which came under intense criticism by the press and
by Nicholas Carbone — by then director of a legislative think tank on municipal issues
— but allowed for minimal layoffs.
One strategy we resisted, which has been the hallmark of the succeeding city govern-
ment, is a move toward privatization, a strategy eagerly embraced by the current board
of education— the first such entity in the country to privatize the management of the
entire school system— but also championed by the succeeding mayor and city council
majority. Several members of the 1991-1993 city council on both sides of the five-four
divide had ties to organized labor and were philosophically inclined against privatiza-
tion, so such measures were not considered seriously. There was general consensus that
cheaper, privatized services were not adequate answers to Hartford's problems as com-
pared to regionalization and state-level solutions to the fiscal problems of central cities.
Other Positive Accomplishments
Despite the formidable obstacles and disappointments suffered by those of us who want-
ed a progressive coalition to succeed, several more accomplishments consistent with
progressive orientations were achieved. Both affirmative action and economic develop-
ment efforts can be mentioned. Some have withstood the transition to the next regime,
while others have been erased since December 1993.
Affirmative Action. As in other cities that elect African-American mayors, one of the
key improvements during our administration was gains in affirmative action among
the leadership of the city workforce. First, the composition of the city council itself was
for the first time more balanced and reflected the city's population: three African-
Americans, three Puerto Ricans, and three whites; five women and four men. Three of
us were full-time public-sector employees and public-sector union members. Hartford
had an African-American female mayor, an African-American city manager, a Puerto
Rican corporation counsel. Moreover, during his tenure, Stanback appointed a number
of people of color as key department heads, including the city's first African-American
police chief and first African-American fire chief. He named Puerto Ricans and African-
Americans as heads of a number of departments, as well as deputy city manager and
other important administrative posts. Many of Stanback's appointees have since been
replaced.
Reorganization for Economic Development. Within city government, reorganization
was accomplished to combine and unify the various economic development functions.
Work was done to create more collaboration across departments and a greater preference
for customer service among the staff. 25 Housing, planning, redevelopment, and business
retention departments were placed in one new division, Community and Economic
Development, to maximize collaboration. Efforts were undertaken to develop closer ties
to area higher education institutions for consultation on business development. Some
of this has been unassembled since our leaving office, but many of the initiatives will
certainly benefit our successors.
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Construction Projects as Economic Development. A vital thrust in economic develop-
ment was to ensure that opportunities were being created for local and minority busi-
nesses. A model used with partial success on a school renovation project in Hartford
offers an interesting method for maximizing minority business participation in munici-
pal projects served as a pilot program for a larger school construction project. The mil-
lions of new construction dollars in the pipeline generated demands for inclusion of
minority contractors and minority construction trade entrepreneurs in the project.
Stanback had employed a similar model in the O'Hare Airport expansion projects in
which the construction was broken down into small jobs for which minority contractors
could bid and more easily obtain the financial guarantees necessary to participate in
such endeavors. Instead of using a general contractor, the city would retain the services
of a construction manager, a private firm that would act as the city's agent and attempt
to carry out social goals such as affirmative action and minority business participation in
the selection of companies to be involved in the project. Larger contracting firms had
the capacity to bid on jobs either as general contractor or construction manager. The
construction manager would be responsible for working with the city and devising bid
packages that would lend themselves to the inclusion of small, minority businesses.
The project became embroiled in the incessant political maneuvering that takes place
within the council. A selection panel that included four council members — serendipi-
tously three from the minority caucus — and several city and school board employees
initially selected a firm for construction manager whose proposal included a partnership
with another firm experienced in the development of financial assistance to minority
businesses in the areas of bonding and finance. This plan would be useful in achieving
the goal of maximum participation of minority businesses that would be urged to
employ and train local residents in need of employment. In an unusual insertion of itself
into the affairs of the city manager's office, the council majority rejected the city man-
ager's formal resolution to the council to hire the selection panel's choice and another
company, approved by the majority, was selected. That company faltered badly in
attempting to manage the project and was finally released. Stanback, whose expertise
would have been required to make the effort work, left the city manager's office in
December 1993; the building trades had put up obstacles to the minority firm goals; and
the renovation fell more than a year behind schedule.
A Clash of Priorities
Adolph Reed urges an examination of whether a "black regime maximizes the options
open to it, within its limited sphere, to press the interests of the rank-and-file black
constituency" rather than capitulate to the progrowth corporate agenda that has gener-
ated a marginalized urban poor. 26 Experiences in Hartford reveal the response on the
part of a highly organized corporate sector to attempts at progressive governance to
pursue these goals. Utilizing Paul Peterson's categories of the policies undertaken by
municipal government— developmental, allocational, and redistributional — the
critical dimension of the fight over city hall in a city such as Hartford in this period is
the conflict between the redistributional needs of those who remain in central cities
and the developmental needs of those who amass profits in cities. 27 At times, public offi-
cials who seek to address these two sets of needs can coexist in local legislative and
administrative bodies. But when redistributional issues are seen as too costly or a per-
ception develops that officeholders are going too far, as I believe was the case with
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Hartford's corporate sector during 1991-1993, and with buttressing by traditional
political rivals, there is hardly space for a progressive regime to succeed or even to
attempt to succeed. In Hartford, government capacity is so severely strained that even
allocational issues — public safety, sanitation service, parks, and so forth— took on
a redistributional dimension.
Using Martin Shefter's imperatives of local officeholders, even the successes of
generating sufficient votes in 1991 and preserving Hartford's credit rating, which was
AA in 1993, did not overcome the problem of regulating and containing conflict among
city residents. 28 As we attempted to open up government, greater expectations devel-
oped, more conflict ensued, and more disappointments followed. How conflict was
fueled, orchestrated, and taken advantage of contributed to our most severe problems,
lack of unity and unfulfilled expectations.
The urban regime literature primarily considers questions of development as the
defining element of urban politics, but issues of race, redistribution, social consumption,
and other areas may need to figure more prominently in the discussion, notably in
older cities such as Hartford, with political leadership of color, at least insofar as they
constitute a compelling agenda for urban policymakers. Particularly when the urban
government undergoes dramatic shifts, vacillating between progressive regimes and
urban conservatism, the embodied frustrations require deeper analysis. New urban-based
social movements, identity politics, other embodiments of popular grievance, and a
backlash to these developments also factor into the urban political terrain and assert
their presence in the electoral arena.
The Continuing Significance of Race and Its Manipulation
The shift in character from the 1991-1993 City Hall leadership to the 1993-1995
council majority and mayor could be construed as a rejection of progressive or redistrib-
utive initiatives by the local electorate. However, one could argue that there were
additional dynamics at play, that the shift was more centrally concerned with race and
the opportunity for whites to reassert political control. White voters easily grasped
this possibility, and South End politicians, fortifying the urban political trenches, could
exploit it. 29 Impressions of incumbent officeholders were orchestrated by downtown
business interests which felt threatened by the thrust of the Perry coalition, aided by the
Hartford Couranfs editorial policy, in a manner that played upon the anxiety of the
electorate. The racial dimensions of the 1993 election would be paramount, but they
would not be publicly acknowledged as the issue within the election. Furthermore,
a split in the Puerto Rican political community produced sufficient support for mayoral
candidate Michael Peters to garner an important cushion in his margin of victory and
also for the Republicans against People for Change.
The fusion slate gained the support of downtown interests not necessarily because
of a preference for Republican social welfare policies, although certain members of
that group may have held such beliefs, as much as fear that People for Change and the
more liberal Democrats would go too far in the redistributional direction, too far in
their support of labor, and create obstacles for or minimize the corporate agenda. Also,
the patronage network that existed and fed off of contracts and arrangements with
City Hall and various other city agencies rightly feared that new arrangements could and
would be fashioned. We were perceived as a threat by this combination of forces, for
whom our defeat was important.
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Possibilities for Redistribution
Although some of us were clearly interested in using the electoral arena and local gov-
ernment to pursue a redistributional agenda focusing on impoverished communities
of color, we were not sufficiently powerful to obstruct the developmental needs of the
corporate sector if community benefits and fairness to the local workforce could accrue,
no matter how leftist our personal ideologies. Still, I believe, the corporate interests
disproportionately feared our agenda and did not fully understand the inherent limits
that people like me perceived we faced. Even when we tried to accommodate the con-
cerns of business interests on issues of downtown development, job training programs,
public safety, and other concerns, or when we concurred with the Chamber of Com-
merce on such issues as opposing a proposal for a casino, they were sufficiently discom-
fited to warrant their intense mobilization in opposition to our reelection.
A personal example drove this point home to me. During the spring of 1993 there
was a possibility of moving the New England Patriots from Boston to Hartford. As an
alternative to a widely heralded proposal to build a casino in Hartford, the Patriots move
seemed much more desirable and could defuse casino support. Several of us participated
in booster campaign activities to bring the football team to Hartford. Having grown up
in Wisconsin during the Green Bay Packers' glory years, I appreciated the game and
thought that professional football was much better for Hartford than casino gambling.
When I appeared with Mayor Perry at a downtown rally to support the effort, the presi-
dent of the Chamber of Commerce, an important actor in the electoral campaign against
us, astonished to see me at such an event, said to me, "Who would have thunk [sic] it!"
Perhaps his patronizing comment was his attempt to overcome the social tension of
sharing the platform with me. After all, I was not hostile to such grand economic devel-
opment schemes in and of themselves, but they had to provide tangible benefits to the
people of the impoverished neighborhoods, who were my first concern.
The Battle over What?
Since leaving office, I have watched a new governing philosophy emerge in Hartford,
one of privatization, minimization of local government's role in solving social problems,
and true hostility toward the poor and the programs that service their needs. The differ-
ence is stark and, for many of us, frightening. The new regime, particularly its mayor,
has a brilliant public relations apparatus and overwhelming support from the Hartford
Courant that downplays the severity of the impact of its policies. Their intent is to
depopulate the city of its poor by dismantling public housing, razing abandoned housing
that could be rehabilitated in new configurations, and dismantling supportive social ser-
vices. Whether such strategies are peculiar to Hartford or replicated elsewhere, they
seem to represent an extreme approach to urban governance, which has been bolstered
by political shifts in Congress.
Despite all the constraints and contention, there are possibilities, limited to be sure,
for reform and redistribution at City Hall. Progressive movements, particularly those
with roots and ties in the communities of color, offer some hope that life in American
cities can be a little easier, a little less harsh, with a greater degree of popular participa-
tion. Furthermore, the adoption of an advocacy posture by local government, both in
and of itself and in combination with progressive forces, is another dimension of the
battle, another political choice for urban officeholders. Serious questions remain as to
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how to ensure that politicians who emanate from these urban social movements remain
connected to their popular base and how to link these localized movements to a larger,
more national whole, subjects for much more future speculation. **
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